# git.makefuture.ro — Forgejo.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Deployed to /opt/web/caddy/etc/conf.d/git.makefuture.caddy on the web box.
# conf.d is shared with makefuture.ro, chat.makefuture.ro, eratic.ro and
# opus.ro, so everything here is scoped to this hostname and defines no
# snippets.
#
# This vhost carries the web UI and git-over-HTTPS. Git over SSH does not pass
# through here at all — it is not HTTP — and reaches the container directly on
# port 2222.

git.makefuture.ro {
	reverse_proxy forgejo:3000 {
		# A `git push` of a large repository is one long request body, and a
		# `git clone` is one long response. Both can outlast a default
		# proxy timeout on a slow link and fail halfway with a broken pipe.
		transport http {
			read_timeout 30m
			write_timeout 30m
		}
	}

	# No `request_body` limit set, deliberately: capping it would reject
	# exactly the large pushes this forge exists to accept.

	header {
		Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
		X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
		X-Frame-Options "DENY"
		Referrer-Policy "no-referrer"
		Permissions-Policy "geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()"
		-Server
		-X-Powered-By
	}

	# No Content-Security-Policy, for the same reason as chat.makefuture.ro:
	# Forgejo renders user-authored markdown, embedded images and syntax
	# highlighting, and ships its own inline scripts. A policy worth having has
	# to be derived from the app's real behaviour and tested against it.

	# No compression directive. Git's own transfer is already compressed, and
	# re-encoding packfiles on the way out would spend CPU for nothing.

	# Consistent with the rest of the box: no request logs. These would record
	# every clone and push, with times and addresses.
	log {
		output discard
	}
}